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"SCHOLARS, STUDENTS AND SANCTIONS" -
DISMISSAL AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MODERN
UNIVERSITY"
Michael J. Beloff Q.C. ••
THEME
I want to explore the extent to which the law controls the powers of academic
institutions to expel their senior and junior members; and to see what lessons can
be drawn by the academic institutions themselves to protect themselves against,
if not litigation itself, at least litigation in which they are the unsuccessful .
defendants. For universities like other domestic or quasi-domestic institutions
(the controlling bodies of national sports being, in my professional experience
another notorious example) have been slow to realise that the wielding of
arbitrary power, which has characterised their behaviour - in the case of.Oxford
and Cambridge and their colleges for several centuries - is no longer compatible
with the development of natural justice - and renders them vulnerable to
challenge in the new rights - based culture of our times. It is by no means
inconceivable that a university which sends a student down for failing
examinations will find itself at the receiving end of a writ for negligent tuition.l
The boundaries of negligence, in the field of education, as elsewhere, are never
closed.2
• Based on a talk given at London School of Economics Law Society: 13th. February,
1997. I am grateful to Sarah-Jane Davies, my colleague at 4-5 Grays Inn Square for her
assistance with this talk .
•• President, Trinity College, Oxford, Judge of Court of Appeal, Jersey and Guernsey,
Master of the Bench of Grays Inn.
I See e.g. The SundayTimes, 9th. February, 1997, p.l. An earlier example is provided by
Sammy v. Birkheck College The Times 3rd. November, 1964. See also De Mello v.
Loughhorough College of Technology The Times 17th. June, 1970.
2 Xv. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] A.C.633.
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SOURCE OF POWERS
What is the source of a University's or College's powers to tenninate
relationships and impose sanctions? In the case of its academic staff the answer
lies essentially in contract, qualified by statute. In the case of its junior members,
the answer lies essentially in contract too. The recent Report of the Task Force
on Student Disciplinary Procedures [The Zellick Report] stated:
"A university derives its disciplinary authority from its contractual
relationship with the individual student, and possibly also from the
student's membership ofthe University where that is formally
recognised in the instrument of Government. In consequence the
student is expressly or by necessary implication required to
subscribe to the rules of the institution for the time being in force.,,3
The loco parentis theorl has long since been discarded, although there are
echoes of it in the judgment ofPennycuick 1. in Glynn v. University of Keele.S
The remedies for breach will be those of private law, damages, injunction,
declaration.
But public law remedies may also be appropriate where the University is
founded by statute6 or by statutory order.? In R. v. R.M.M. U. ex p. Nolan, Sedley
J. said categorically:
3 C.Y.c.P. 1994 p. I. In his Report on the Sit-in at Cambridge University (1973,
para.154) Lord Devlin said that the foundation of the disciplinary power was the contract of
matriculation. See also generally Lewis, "The Legal Nature of a University and the Student-
University Relationship" 1985 15 Ottawa L. Rev. 249.cf Pharoah, "Public Law or Private
Contract: Judicial Review in the statutory Higher Education Institutions" 1997 E.P.L.I. vol 2
Issue 3.
4 Lewis, ibid. at 252-253.
5 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 487 at 494E-H.
6 E.g. Spruce v. University (?f Hong Kong [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 65.
7 E.g. Merdeka University Bhd. v. Government (?f Malaysia 2 M.L.J. 356 (1982); 2
Malaya L.Rev. 243 where I represented a group of Chinese Guilds and Associations who sought
to establish a private university in Malaysia., where the tuition would be in Chinese: and lost in the
Court of Appeal: the majority (4) being Malay, the minority (1) being Chinese.
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"The Respondent is a public institution discharging a public function
and having no visitor. It is subject to judicial review of its decisions
on conventional grounds.,,8
What of the position of universities founded by charter i.e. under the
prerogative? Professor Wade has argued that a charter confers only the powers
of a natural person upon a university. It has no authority to determine the rights
of anyone by virtue of its chartered status alone. Its regulations depend for their
legal force upon incorporation in a contract. The situation can be contrasted with
statutory universities which, while they have jurisdiction only over those with
whom they enter into a contractual relationship can thereafter point to statute as a
source oftheir rule-making powers.9 The recent case of R. v. The Jockey Club,
ex p. The Aga Khan certainly suggests that not all chartered bodies are amenable
to judicial review. to .
But a charter is, in my view, a source of powers, as well as a source of
capacity: certainly it defines powers. Moreover universities are performing public
functions in the modern sense: education is primarily the necessary responsibility
of the State. A university's autonomy is not threatened by the use of public law
remedies against it; and public law principles (especially as to fair procedures)
can inform the relationship of even private persons, where the private authority
wields significant powers. 11
Statute or charter can add to, subtract from or qualifY contractual rights: and
the governing instruments of universities will certainly be relevant in so far as
any contract includes by necessary implication a provision that the university will
only act within its powers and in accordance with its duty as laid down in the
8 [1994] E.L.R. 381 at 384.See generally Lewis "Litigation and the University
Student"("Lewis on Litigation") Ch. 9 in McManus "Education and the Courts" Sweet and
Maxwell, 1998 especially at pp 170 - 173
9 HW.R.Wade, 85 L.Q.R. 468: 90 L.Q.R. 157.
10 [1993] 1W.L.R. 909.
IIE.g. Breen v. A.E. U. [1971] 2Q.B. 175per Lord Denning M.R. at 190.See generally
on the availabilityof judicial review Harris "Judicial Review and Education" in "Judicial Review
and Social We(fare",Cassels 1997 and "Education and Judicial Review - an Overview" 1997
E.P.L.l. (Issue 5) 24 at p. 25; Farrington "Resolving Complaints by Students in Higher
Education" 1996 E.P.L.I. (issue 1) 7 at p 9.
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procedures contained in those instnllllents.
TENURE
Against that background I start with consideration of an academic quasi-myth -
that of tenure. It is a legitimate concern of academics that they may be vulnerable
to discipline or even dismissal, not on account of the incompetence of their
teaching, but because of the unpopularity of their views. It is therefore regarded
as a cornerstone of academic freedom that university teachers should have
security of tenure for life, or at any rate until normal retiring age, subject only to
not breaching the terms of their employment in some significant - in the language
of the cases 'repudiatory' - way, or being otherwise guilty of misconduct.
Whether t'was ever thus, I shall not explore; it certainly has not been thus usually
for the recent past and will not be thus in the perceptible future. Insecurity rather
than security of tenure is the dismal prospect for the modem academic -
unsurprisingly so when there are too many dons chasing too few jobs.
The concept of tenure was touched on in the celebrated case of R. v. University
of Hull Visitor ex p. Page ['Page1.12 In 1966 the applicant was appointed a
lecturer to the university by a letter which, inter alia, stated (critically) that his
appointment might be terminated by either party on giving three months' notice
in writing. The appointment was subject to the university statutes which, inter
alia, required the applicant to retire from office at age of 67. By section 34(1) of
the statutes members of the staff who held their appointment until retirement
might be removed "for good cause," and by section 34(3) subject to the terms of
his appointment no member of the teaching staff could be removed save for good
cause. In 1988 the university purportedly terminated the applicant's contract of
employment not for good cause but on the ground of redundancy, giving him
three months' written notice. He petitioned the visitor of the university for a
declaration that such purported dismissal was contrary to section 34 so as to be
ultra vires the university's powers and accordingly invalid. The visitor, Lord
Jauncey of Tullichettle dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal found there was
no presumption in favour oftenure.13
12 [1993] A.C.682 (H.L.) & [1991] 1 W.L.R. I2V7(C.A.). Cffor Canada Khan. A
"CanadianUniversityAcademic Tenure Implications" Education and the Law vol 9 no 2 1997 P
109 if
13 Staughton L.J. said ibid:
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Notwithstanding that analysis, I was recently instructed on behalf of another
University, whose name I cannot for reasons of client confidence disclose, whose
"Thus far I have said nothing about academic tenure. I fully appreciate that
importance is attached tojob security by those who teach at universities; and I
see nothing improbable in the University of Hull in 1966 appointing someone as
a lecturer until the age of 67, !>7J~iectonly to good cause. The statute itself
contemplated that this might happen. But, equally, I see nothing improbable in
the universityappointing someone on terms that he should remain until that age,
unless three months' notice was given sooner. Accordingly, it is in my judgment
right to approach the problem from a neutral position, without any predisposition
to favour one solution or the other. That I have sought to do.
Likewise, I would see nothing improbable in the university binding itself to Mr
Page for a longer period than Mr Page was bound to the university, if it chose to
do so. But in my opinion it did not."[at 1289] [emphasis added].
Farquarson L.J. said:
"[Counsel for Mr. Page] approaches the task of construction on what might be
described aspolicy grounds. He !>7Jbmitshat the purpose of those sections in the
!>1atuteis topreserve and guarantee academic freedom. No teacher should be at
risk of di!>wissalbecausehe expressesradical or unpopular opinions. He is given
protection against such a risk by the provision that he can only be dismissed for
"good cause" as expressed in the statute, which, broadly speaking, relates to
immoral conduct of a disgraceful nature or incapacity. Recognition of the
importance ofthis safeguard is to be found in the Education Reform Act 1988 in
section 202(2)(a) and 203(1)(b). The introductory words of section 34(3) of the
statutes could not therefore have been intended to remove the protection given to
university teachers. [Counsel for Mr. Page] argues that, if the university's
construction is correct, the whole edifice set up by the section is destroyed. There
would be no point in going through the painful and difficult task of proving
disgraceful conduct by or incapacity of a member of the university staff if the
problem could be resolved more simply by giving three months' notice.
These are cogent arguments but for my part I find it difficult to spell out the
policy suggested from these two sections. Theprovisions are equally consistent
with a view which might be taken by the university that with falling rolls and
increasing expenditure it could not afford a guarantee of employment for a
professional lifetime. I agree with Mr. Burke that the two provisions, that is, in
the statutes and in the letter of appointment, sit uneasily together but I do not
accept his approach of attributing a policy to the statutes and then seeking to
construe them in a way which achieves that policy. If the policy was clearly
expressed in the statutes, it might be different but in the present case the task of
the court is to derive the true meaning, if it can, from the words of the section
themselves."[at 1292] [emphasis added).
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solicitor told me that Page was regarded among their staff as establishing the
doctrine of tenure rather than - as was the case - giving it its quietus. In point of
fact, there are not many academic institution in this country which have selected
the second of Staughton L.J. ' s two alternatives (i. e. appointment until retiring
age, subject only to dismissal for good cause14); and, such as have, are no doubt
cursing the draftsman.
One example is provided by Pearce v. University of Birmingham (No.2) where
Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. (sitting as a visitor) held the university had
no power lmder its domestic laws to breach the respondents' contracts of
employment by issuing redundancy notices. IS Under Article 3 of its charter the
University of Birmingham only had power to do acts which complied with the
terms of its charter itself and statutes. The Vice-Chancellor held that if it
implemented the redundancies it would be acting in breach of section XXV of
those statutes, which provided that academic staff could only be dismissed for
good cause, and made no provision for dismissal for redundancy. 16
VISITORS
The chief significance of Page was that it confinned the vitality of another
ancient concept - but in this case a real, not a fanciful one - the jurisdiction of the
visitor. This had been explored in an earlier case in the House of Lords, R. v.
University of Bradford ex p. Thomas ['Thomas1.17
In Thomas the plaintiff was appointed a lecturer in sociology at the University of
Bradford and thus became an employee of the University under a contract of
service, the holder of office in and member qfthe University, [which by Royal
Charter was a corporation within a visitor's jurisdiction], and a corporator. The
University purported to dismiss the plaintiff. She brought an action claiming,
inter alia, a declaration that the University's decision to dismiss her was ultra
vires, null and void by reason of non-compliance with the disciplinary rules and
procedures contained in the University's charter, statutes, ordinances and
14 See ibid..
15 [1991] 2 All E.R. 461.
16 See now the Education Reform Act s.203(1 )(b).
11 [1987] A.C.795 in which I had appeared for the applicant teacher.
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regulations, and incorporated in the contract. She also claimed damages for
breach of contract or alternatively arrears of salary.
It was held that where a dispute related to the correct interpretation and fair
administration of the domestic laws of the University, its statutes and its
ordinances, it fell within the jurisdiction of the visitor and not the courts of law.
Notwithstanding that the disputes resolution would affect the plaintiff's contract
of employment the plaintiff was not relying upon a contractual obligation apart
from an obligation of the University to comply with its own domestic laws.
Accordingly, her claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor, subject
to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
By way of consolation it was also held that the visitor in the course of his
supervisory jurisdiction must be entitled, in order to ensure that the domestic law
is properly applied, to redress any grievance that has resulted from its
misapplication. This redress might involve ordering the payment of arrears of
salary where the visitor decides that the employment has not been determined, or
compensation where the complainant has accepted the wrongful repudiation of
his contract of employment.
The House of Lords took the view that the visitor's role was no anachronism
and rejected several propositions of policy and principle which I advanced to
contrary effect. 18
Lord Griffiths concluded:
"I cannot accept that tile continuation of the visitorial jurisdiction
with the scope and powers I have discussed will leave the academic
staff of universities at a significant or at any disadvantage to their
colleagues working in other fields of education. In the first place the
action for wrongful dismissal has largely been superseded by the far
wider protection afforded to employees by the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. All these rights are available
to all university academic staff because Parliament can of course
invade the jurisdiction of the visitor if it chooses to do so. If in the
course of such proceedings any question arises concerning the
interpretation or application of the internal laws of the university, it
will have to be resolved for the purpose of tile case by the tribunal
hearing tile application. Such power must be implicit in the remedies
provided by the Act, and to this extent, Parliament has given rights
18 See summary of my submissions, ibid at 802B-C.
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that enter and supersede the jurisdiction of the visitor. I cannot
accept the suggestion that if in the course of a tribunal hearing a
question arises concerning the interpretation of university statutes
etc., the case should be adjourned pending a decision by the visitor.
This would be altogether too unwieldy a procedure and cannot have
been the intention of Parliament.
Secondly, if what is really sought is reinstatement, it is more likely to be
achieved by appeal to the visitor than to the courts. As a general rule the
courts will not enforce a contract of service and the delay that inevitably
results between the dismissal and the date upon which the case comes
before the court makes reinstatement all the less likely, for by the time the
case is heard the plaintiff's post will have already been filled. The appeal
to the visitor is, however, a speedy and informal procedure and
reinstatement can be considered without the constraints imposed by' the
passage of time.
It is true that the decision of the visitor is final and the parties are thus
deprived of challenging a decision in the Court of Appeal and perhaps the
House of Lords. But is this a disadvantage or an advantage? I rather think
it is an advantage. Today the visitors of universities either are or include
independent persons of the highest judicial eminence. Would'not most
people consider it better to accept the decision of such a person rather than
face the risk of the matter dragging on through the years until the appellate
process has finally ground to a halt. There is also the advantage of
cheapness, lack of fonnality and flexibility in the visitorial appeal
procedure which is not bound by the intimidating and formalised
procedures of the courts of law.
Finally, there is the protection afforded by the supervisory, as opposed to
appellate, jurisdiction of the High Court over the visitor .
....These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the visitorial
jurisdiction subject to which all our modern universities have been founded
is not an ancient anachronism which should now be severely curtailed, if
not discarded. If confined to its proper limits, namely, the laws of the
foundation and matters deriving therefrom, it provides a practical and
expeditious means of resolving disputes which it is in the interests of the
universities and their members to preserve. "19
19 Ibid at 824C-825D. See also Sir Robert Megarry Y.-c. in Patel v. University of
BradfordSenate [1978] 1W.L.R. 1488 at 1499-1500.
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson said supportively:
"The advantages of having an informal system which produces a
speedy, cheap and final answer to internal disputes has been
repeatedly emphasised in the authorities, most recently by this
House in Thomas v. University o/Bradford [1987] A.C. 795: see
per Lord Griffiths at p.825D; see also Patel v. University of
Bradford Senate [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1488, 1499-1500. Ifit were to be
held that judicial review for error of law lay against the visitor I fear
that, as in the present case, finality would be lost not only in cases
raising pure questions of law but also in cases where it would be
urged in accordance with tlle Wednesbury principles (Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948]
1 K.B. 223) that the visitor had failed to take into account relevant
matters or taken into account irrelevant matters or had reached an
irrational conclusion. Although the visitor's position is anomalous, it
provides a valuable machinery for resolving internal disputes which
should not be lost. "20
The visitors' jurisdiction extends to all questions arising out of the institution's
internal rules, notwithstanding that tlley involve contractual relations and
notwithstanding that the complainant is not a member of the institution.21
In Oakes v. Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, the Courts refused to entertain
action by student who had failed an examination and whom the college refused to
readmit.22 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.-c. held that the jurisdiction of the
visitor did not depend on the nature of the plaintiff's membership of the college,
but on whether the rights claimed arose under its domestic law; and that,
although the plaintiff was not a corporator of the college, but merely a member in
20 Ibid. at p.704D-E
21 For valuable surveys of the law see J.W. Bridge, (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 531; P.M. Smith
(1981) 97 L.Q.R. 610 and (1986) 136 N.L.J. 484,519,567; Picarda, The Law and Practice
Relating to Charities (2nd.ed.,1995,Butterworths) at 521-539; Lewis, Litigation p 179-180; For
the rights of students generally see A.Samuels, [1973] J.S.P.T.L. 252. For recent cases
confirming the exclusivity of the visitorial jurisdicition see Joseph v Board of Examiners of the
CLE [1994] E.L.R. 407, R v Visitors of the Inner Temple, ex parte Bullock [1990] E.L.R. 349;
R v University of Nottingham ex p. K [1998] E.L.R. 185.
22 [1988] 1W.L.R. 431.
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statu pupillari, his claim was to enforce rights which he enjoyed under the
domestic or internal law of the college.23
In R. v. Committee ~rthe Privy Council ex p. Vijayatunga where the complaint
was to the appointment of allegedly inappropriate P.C.D. examiners, it was held
that a visitor enjoys the widest power to investigate and correct wrongs within
his jurisdiction.24 Simon Brown 1. (at first instance) analysed the breadth of
jurisdiction thus:
"I conclude that the visitor enjoys untrammelled jurisdiction to
investigate and correct wrongs done in the administration of the
internal law of the foundation to which he is appointed: a general
power to right wrongs and redress grievances. And if that on
occasion requires the visitor to act akin rather to an appeal court
than to a review court, so be it. Indeed there may well be occasions
when he could not properly act other than as an essentially appellate
tribunal .... he may, indeed should, investigate the basic facts to
whatever depth he feels appropriate and he may interfere with any
decision which he concludes to be wrong, even though he feels
unable to categorise it as Wednesbury unreasonable .... But it
nevertheless remains important to recognise that many decisions
giving rise to dispute will be subject to considerations which quite
properly inhibit the visitors from embarking upon any independent
fact-finding role. This is as plainly true of the appointment of
examiners as of the decision of such examiners upon the standard
attained by a candidate. But in both cases this seems to me less
because the university statutes expressly entrust those decisions to
the discretion of particular members of the university than that these
members are peculiarly fitted by their eminence, experience and
expertise to arrive at proper decisions.
My final conclusion, therefore, is that the visitor's role cannot properly
be characterised either as supervisory or appellate. It has no exact analogy
23 "It seems to me that in the case of a student at an Oxford or Cambridge .college who is
not a corporator in the sense of being part of the foundation of the college the fact that he is not
a corporator is not necessarily decisive. It may be that, if he is treated throughout as a member
and is seeking to rely on his membership, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the visitor." [ibid. at
440G-H].
24 [1990] 2 Q.B.444.
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with that of the ordinary courts. It cannot usefully be defined beyond
saying that the visitor has untrammelled power to investigate and right
wrongs arising from the application of the domestic laws of a charitable
foundation; untrammelled, that is, save only and always that the visitor
must recognise the full width of his jurisdiction and yet approach its
exercise in any given case reasonably (in the public law sense)."25
In the Court of Appeal Bingham L.J. upheld this approach:
"I wholly agree with the general principles which Simon Brown J.
laid down. The correct approach can, I think, be illustrated by a
hypothetical case involving facts remote from the present. I suppose
a college whose statutes empowered it to terminate a student's
membership, inter alia, if (1) he or she failed after receiving 28
days' written notice to do so to pay any sum owed to the college, or
(2) was guilty of persistent insobriety such as, in the opinion of the
college, to render him or her unfit to remain as a member, or (3)
failed in the opinion of the college to attain the academic standard
required of students of the college. I also suppose an appeal to the
visitor by students whose membership had been determined under
(1), (2) and (3) respectively. In case (1) the visitor's role, although
characterised, one hopes, by the cheapness, lack of formality and
procedural flexibility applauded by Lord Griffiths in Thomas v.
University qf Bra4ford [1987] A.C. 795, 824 would be essentially
that of a first instance judge: that is, he would hear and determine
any disputed issue whether the debt was owed, whether notice was
given, whether there was a failure to pay and whether any defence
of estoppel or a promise of extra time was made out. He would be
the judge of the facts and the law. In case (2) his role would be a
little different. Here, he would, I think, satisfY himself (if it were in
issue) that there was reliable evidence of persistent insobriety not of
a trivial kind. He would further wish to be satisfied, if there were
any reason to doubt, that the college's decision was taken in good
faith and not for any extraneous reason. If satisfied on those points
he would not, even if it were different, substitute his own opinion on
fitness for that of the college. That is because his responsibility is to
25 [1988] Q.B.322 at 344.
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see that the college acts lawfully in accordance with the statutes, not
to act as an independent arbiter of matters entrusted by the statutes
to the judgment of the college and on which its judgment is likely to
be better, because better informed and more experienced, than his.
In case (3) the visitor would, again, satisfy himself (if it were in
doubt) that there was reliable evidence of poor academic
performance and that the college's decision had not been tainted by
bad faith or extraneous motivation. If so satisfied, he would go no
further, for the same reasons as in (2). He could not legitimately
override the college's bona fide assessment, based on reliable
evidence, of the student's academic performance. "26
It was confirmed in Thomas that the visitor, moreover, is subject to judicial
review for breach of natural justice as well as for lack of jurisdiction and of
power, but not (by a 3-2 majority) for error offact or law, the domestic law of
the foundation being distinct from that of the law of the land - a species of
foreign law; R. v. Hull University Visitor ex p. Page.27
This reinforcement of this ancient institution has modem significance. Although
Oxford and Cambridge themselves being civil corporations do not have visitors,
their colleges as eleemosynary corporations do.
New universities created by Charter are also eleemosynary corporations and
have or are entitled to have a visitor, the universities which have acquired the
title only as a result of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 do not. 28 As
Picarda has pointed out the distinction in this context between universities
ancient and modem owes "more to history than to logic. "29 The visitors will
commonly be the Crown (acting through the Lord Chancellor), unless the Crown
or the founder have denominated some other visitor.30
26 Ibid at 457D-458D.
27 Supra. n.12.
28 Picarda, supra.n.21 at 522.
29 Ibid.
30 Trinity College, Oxford has the Bishop of Winchester as its Visitor. All Oxford Colleges
whose Heads are called President have the same bishop as Visitor: but the Bishop is visitor to
some Colleges whose Heads are not called President. lowe this analysis to Lord Bingham of
Cornhill L.C.J.: even he, however, has been unable to explain the rationale for the position.
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Sir Robert Megarry V.-c. was correct to say "the extent of visitatorial
jurisdiction in university life has greatly expanded in recent years in Patel v.
Bradford University Senate, 31 although The Education Refonn Act 1988
[E.R.A.] has to an extent set limits to that expansion.
THE EDUCAnON REFORM ACT 1988
In Page, Lord Griffiths had said:
"If it thought that the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor has
outlived its usefulness, which I beg to doubt, then I think that it
should be swept away by Parliament and not undennined by judicial
review. "32
To an extent this has occurred. Elaborate dismissal procedures for universities
and colleges have been instituted under the E.R.A. sections 202-8.
Transitional provisions are complicated. For example in Pearce v. University
0.(Aston in Birmingham (No.1)[Pearce No.1] it was held as a general rule, under
the common law all disputes between members of the academic staff and their
university fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor.33 On its true
construction section 206(1) of the E.R.A.1988, being expressed in unqualified
tenns, had the effect of excluding the visitor's fonnal jurisdiction in respect of
employment disputes between a university and members of its academic staff. It
followed, therefore, that since the court always had jurisdiction except fa the
extent that statute or a rule of the common law excluded it, the effect of section
206(1) was to restore the court's jurisdiction in such matters, while section
206(2) had the effect of preserving the visitor's jurisdiction in such disputes
provided that they were referred to him before the relevant date, being the date
on which the university commissioners amended the university's statutes to
include new procedures made by them under section 203 of the 1988 Act for the
hearing and detennination of appeals by members of the academic staff who had
been dismissed or were under notice of dismissal, but, lmless and until such a
reference was made and accepted by the visitor, the academic staff were at
31 [1978] 1 W.L.R.1488, affirmed [1979] 1 W.L.R.I066.
32 Supra. n. 12 at 694£.
33 [1991] 2 AllE.R.461. See alsoHines v.Birkbeck College (No.2) [1991] 4 AllE.R.450.
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liberty to bring and continue proceedings in respect of such disputes in the
courts. Although such a construction of section 206(1) and (2) might lead to the
inconvenient and perhaps costly result that the jurisdiction of the court, once
involved, would be ousted if one of the parties to the dispute subsequently made
a successful reference to the visitor, that result, however inconvenient, was
irrelevant because the wording of the two subsections was clear, and since it did
not lead to any absurdity the court was bound to give the statutory provisions due
effect. It followed that since the new appeal procedures had not been
incorporated into the university's statutes and the relevant date had not arrived,
the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's dispute with the university.
To that extent Parliament has transferred the jurisdiction of the visitor to
special statutory bodies and tribunals.
STATUTORY RIGHTS
Where tlle statutory law of employment protection against unfair dismissal is
engaged, it is, of course, overriding.34Those rights are currently contained in the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 ss. 54-80, as amended.
NATURAL JUSTICE
Whatever the machinery of enforcement, the courts have in general held that
academic disciplinary proceedings require the observance of the principles of
natural justice: and have been willing to intervene since as far back as the case of
Dr. Bentley, where the complainant had been deprived of his degrees for alleged
contempt of the Vice-Chancellor's Court.3SThe Court enjoyed jurisdiction since
the complaint was against the University, as distinct from a College. Fortescue J.
plucked precedent from prehistory:
"1 remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon
such an occasion that even God himself did not pass sentence upon
Adam before he was called upon to make his defence."36
34 Thomas (supra) at p.824.
35 R. v. University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str. 557.
36 Ibid. at 567.
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A university lecturer was, it is tnle, in one case held by the Privy Council to be a
mere contractual employee, so that he could be dismissed without a hearing as
explained in the preceding section. This was in Vidyodaya University v. Silva.3?
This decision has been criticised by high authority, Lord Wilberforce, and is not
now a safe guide.38
Wade and Forsyth conclude cautiously:
"But it is at least possible that academic staff of some grades may in
law be mere servants. More probably holders of established posts
would be regarded as office-holders and so entitled to the benefit of
natural justice."39
STUDENTS
Students have the protection of their contracts of membership: it will be
implied that in return for their fees they will be treated in accordance with the
37 [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77; & ibid. at 558.
38 In Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1578 he said:
"One such, which I refer to because it may be thought to have some relevance
here, is Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva []965] ] W.L.R. 77, concerned
with a university professor, who was dismissed without a hearing. He succeeded
before the Supreme Court of Ceylon in obtaining an order for certiorari to quash
the decision of the University, but that judgment was set aside by the Privy
Council on the ground that the relation was that of master and servant to which
the remedy of certiorari had no application. It would not be necessary or
appropriate to disagree with the procedural or even the factual basis on which this
decision rests: but I must confess that I could not follow it in this country in so far
as it involves a denial of any remedy of administrative law to analogous
employments. Statutory provisions similar to those on which the employment
rested would tend to show, to my mind, in England or in Scotland, that it was one
of a sufficiently public character, or one partaking sufficiently of the nature of an
office, to attract appropriate remedies of administrative law."[at 1596F-H].
39 In Administrative Law (7th.ed.,Oxford University Press, 1994) at 564. For a
comparison of the way the law treats staff and students in disciplinary issues see Walker and
Woolf" Staffand Students Discip]ine - Similarities or Differences" E.P.L.I. ]997 (issue 1) 13.
Commenting on the contractual relationship of the students with the university or college see
Farrington, note J J supra, says" Departure from express procedural rules will also give rise to
a justiciable claim" Lewis Litigation p 173 -4
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university or college rules, and be entitled to such protection as those rules
confer. In Herring v. Templeman [Herring] the student was dismissed on
academic grounds; the recommendation being made by the academic board;
confirmed by the principal; and upheld by the Governing Body.40It was held the
allegations in the statement of claim would be struck out; there had been no
breach of the rules of natural justice. One cannot help but note that whatever
natural justice was said to apply in theory it proved elusive to identify its
requirements in practice. The first two stages of the procedure were said not to
attract it because they led to recommendations only, the last because the body
lacked the relevant expertise to adjudicate upon academic matters. First of all, by
the academic board: no implied obligation to accord a hearing to a student could
be imposed on a board which only had power to make recommendations to
expel. It was tlle board's duty to form an unbiassed assessment of the plaintiff's
standard of work based on the entirety of his record and potential, and in making
such an assessment with a view to deciding on its recommendation it was entitled
to take everything it thought relevant into account; the board had taken into
account nothing that it was not entitled to do.41
Secondly by the principal: there was no ground for implying a term that the
recommendation of the academic board should be formally re-opened at a
hearing before the principal before he decided whether or not to pass it on as his
own.42
Thirdly by the governing body: the assumption that the plaintiff was entitled as
of right to a full legal trial on every detailed matter was fallacious; the hearing
before the governing body was neither a law suit nor a legal arbitration; its
purpose was to give the student a fair chance to show why the recommendations
of the academic board, which was the competent body to make an assessment,
and the principal should not be accepted; it was tlle duty of the governing body to
act fairly. On the evidence there was notlling to show that it had acted unfairly in
any way; the plaintiff had been told why the recommendations were made and
what the relevant facts were.43Natural justice was like the bed of Procrustes, the
fit was never perfect.
40 [1973] 3 All E.R. 569 at 585.
41 Ibid. at 584d-f & 585j -586b &e, post.
42 Ibid. at 584d & 586f -j.
43 Ibid. at 587b-e & 588b, c, e & g, post.
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Perhaps the clue lies in the concluding words of the judgment:
"It will be appreciated that for the governing body to accept a
recommendation such as this must be distasteful to it; but in a
proper case the responsibility cannot be shirked if the public interest
in competent teaching in schools is to be protected.'>44
The importance to students of the issues involved has rarely been underrated.
In Herring Russell L.J. said:
"In dealing with this aspect of the case, since in every case what are
the requirements of natural justice must depend on all the
circumstances, we appreciate that the consequences of dismissal are
very serious for the plaintiff, who hopes to earn his living in the
teaching profession. ,,45
In R. v. Aston University Senate ex p. Rq{fey, Donaldson 1. said:
"Mr. Pantridge was a student member ofthe university enjoying the
rights and privileges of that status with the chance of achieving
graduate status in due time. The sanction which the university was
entitled to impose was total deprivation of that status and of the
chance of improving it thereafter. Furthermore, as Mr. Pantridge
found to his cost, an ex-student member of a university may well be
in a more disadvantageous position than one who aspires for the first
time to student status. There have been more momentous decisions
than that made by the examiners in the case of Mr. Pantridge, but
there can be no denying its gravity from his point of view. ,,46
However It is a notable feature of the cases on student discipline and dismissal
that, either the treatment metered out was found to be fair - or, if it was not,
discretionary reasons were somehow found to deny relief.
In the former category (no unfairness) is Ceylon University v. Fernando where
44 Ibid. at 588g-h.
45 Ibid. at 582f-g.
46 [1969] 2 Q.B. 538 at 552D-E.
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the misconduct alleged was cheating in exams.47 It was held, that in the absence
in the relevant clause of the statutes of the University of any express requirement
as to the procedure to be followed at the inquiry, such procedure must comply
with the elementary and essential principles of fairness. This must as a matter of
necessary implication be treated as applicable in the discharge of the Vice-
Chancellor's admittedly quasi-judicial functions under clause 8. The Vice-
Chancellor could, however, obtain information in any way he thought best, and it
was open to him, if he thought fit, to question witnesses without inviting the
respondent to be present, but a fair opportunity must have been given to the
student to correct or contradict any relevant statement to his prejudice.
In Ward v. Bradford Corporation, a woman teacher training student was found
with a man in her room.48 It was held that the members of the disciplinary
committee were entitled to seek advice from the director of education as a whole
on a particular policy, and on the application of that policy to the circumstapces
of a particular case, so that the case came within the exceptions to the general
rule that no person ought to participate in the deliberations of a judicial or quasi-
judicial body unless he was a member of it. Accordingly, the participation of the
director had not been such as to invalidate the proceedings, though it would be
better in future for the director of education or his representative not to
participate in the disciplinary cOlmnittee's deliberations, and that the rules should
be amended to make that clear.
Lord Denning said:
"If there were any evidence that Miss Ward had been treated in any
way unfairly or unjustly I would be in favour of interfering. But I do
not think she was treated unfairly or unjustly. She had broken the
rules most flagrantly. She had invited a man to her room and lived
there with him for weeks on end. I say nothing about her morals.
She claims that they are her own affair. So be it. If she wanted to
live with this man, she could have gone into lodgings in the towD
and no-one would have worried, except perhaps her parents. Instead
of going into lodgings she had tllis man with her; night after night, in
the hall of residence where such a thing was absolutely forbidden.
That is a fine example to set to others. And she is a girl training to
be a teacher! I expect the governors and the staff all thought that she
47 [1960] 1W.L.R. 223.
48 (I972) 70 L.G.R. 27.
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was quite an unsuitable person for it. She would never make a
teacher. No parent would knowingly entrust their child to her care.
Six members of the disciplinary committee voted decisively for her
expulsion. Not a single vote was cast against it, nor for any less
sentence. Three abstained for reasons best known to themselves."49
This was a blatant example of substance trumping procedure. Moreover, the
requirements of fairness are painted with a broad brush.
A student may be rusticated from his college without an oral hearing, ifhe has
been told the nature of the complaints against him and given a fair opportunity to
state his case in writing. 50
The same conclusion was reached in Spruce v. University of Hong Kong,
where the lecturer was dismissed for indulging in covert practice at the Bar to the
perceived detriment of her University responsibilities. 51 Lord Browne-Wilkinson
said:
"There is no general principle that the rules of natural justice require
an oral hearing, let alone an oral speech in mitigation. "52
No appeal is required. In Brighton Corporation v. Parry, a local authority was
held entitled to an injunction to restrain a President of the Students' Union from
entering the premises of a teacher training college nm and managed by it when
restricted by Governors upheld a decision of the academic board.53 Willis 1. said:
"In my view, the audi alteram partem rule was complied with aD
the facts of this case by the defendant being allowed to make written
representations for the board's consideration:
... it seems to me, on the facts, first that the defendant knew
precisely the nature of the complaints which were made about him;
secondly, that he was given an opportunity to state his case; and
49 Ibid. at 35.
50 Brighton Corporation v. Parry (1972) 70 L.G.R. 576
5\ Supra.n.6.
52 Ibid. at 72
53 Supra. n.50.
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thirdly, that the tribunal acted in good faith. In those circumstances,
it seems to me - on those three findings - that it is conclusive that
there was no breach of the rules of natural justice in the defendant's
exclusion from an oral hearing by the board. On the contrary he was,
I think, treated with complete fairness throughout. ... He has since
acted in the plainest defiance of the authority of the college of which
he is a student. It may be that he considers his actions justified as a
means of challenging and forcing a change in certain of the college
procedures, of which he, and it appears from the evidence filed on
his behalf, the National Union of Students disapprove. If so, it
seems to me that he must have known that any college, which was
not going to abdicate its authority in the face of a student challenge
of that sort, would be bound to find such conduct quite intolerable.
It seems to me, in all the circumstances, therefore, that this is a case
where the plaintiffs are entitled to look to the court to support them
when their authority is deliberately and publicly flouted by an
insubordinate student, particularly when that student is President of
the students' union."s4
In Ward Lord Denning M.R. said:
"Natural justice does not require the provision of an appeal. So long
as the party concerned has a fair hearing by a fair-minded man or
body of men that is enough."ss
In the second category,(discretionary refusal, dspite unfairness) is R v.
University qf Aston ex parte Rq{fey. There the applicants were university
students, and special regulations governing their course provided:
"Students who ... fail in a referred examination, may at the
discretion of the examiners, re-sit the whole examination or may be
required to withdraw from the course.,,56
54 Ibid. at 586.
55 Supra.n.49 at 35.
56 [1969] 2 Q.B. 538
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They were expelled for failure in examinations but succeeded in showing that
they had not been treated in accordance with natural justice by the examiners, but
because the examiners had themselves decided that they be asked to withdraw
after taking into account personal factors as well as examination marks; relief
however was refused owing to undue delay in bringing the proceedings.
In Glynn v. Keele University, a student who had been fined and rusticated for
exhibiting himself nude on the campus was able to show that the Vice-Chancellor
had failed to observe the requirements of natural justice since he had given the
student no hearing initially but had merely informed him that he could appeal
against the penalties.57
57 Supra. n.5 at 494E-Hper Pennycuick V.-c.:
"The context of educational societies involves a special factor which is not present
in other contexts, namely the relation of tutor and pupil; that is to say the society
is charged with the upbringing and supervision of the pupil under tuition, be the
society a university or college, or a school. Where this relationship exists it is quite
plain that on the one hand in certain circumstances the body or individual acting
on behalf of the society must be regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity -
expulsion from the society is the obvious example. On the other hand, there is a
wide range of circumstances in which the body or individual is concerned to
impose penalties by way of domestic discipline. In these circumstances it seems
to me that the body or individual is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at all but
in a magisterial capacity, i.e. in the performance of the rights and duties vested in
the society as to the upbringing and supervision of the members of the society.
No doubt there is a moral obligation to act fairly, but this moral obligation does
not, I think, lie within the purview of the court in its control over quasi-judicial
acts. Indeed, in the case of a schoolboy punishment the contrary would hardly be
argued."
and at 49SC-D:
"!fa student is excluded from the university it is hard to see how he can carry on
his studies at the university.
I have found considerable difficulty in making up my mind as to which side of the line
those powers fall. When the vice-chancellor exercises those powers should he be regarded
as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, or should he be regarded as acting merely in a
magisterial capacity?
On the best consideration I can give it - but let me say at once it is by no means the end
of the matter - I have come to the conclusion that those powers are so fundamental to the
position of a student in the university that the vice-chancellor must be considered as acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity when he exercises them; I do not think it would be right to
treat those powers as merely matters of internal discipline."
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Once again, relief however was refused in discretion, since the facts were not
contested and the penalties were held to be obviously proper.58
There have been some extravagant claims of injustice, Ex Parte Forster, In re
Sydney University, in which a student claimed an alleged absolute right to remain
a member of the university irrespective of examination results, the Court sensibly
denied the existence of any such right. 59
ACADEMIC MATTERS
The courts have always refused to involve themselves in reviewing purely
academic matters e.g. methods or accuracy of academic valuation. This has often
been explained in terms of the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor. 60 But the true
reason is perceived incompetence. In Thorne v. University q[ London, Diplock
L.J. held:
"The High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal from University
examiners; and speaking for my own part, I am very glad that it
declines jurisdiction. "6]
LESSONS
What then are the lessons to be learned?
First, that academic institutions should cause their constituent instruments to be
reviewed by competent lawyers with a view to ensuring that they are both clear
and fair. The "contracts" are rarely to be found in a single convenient document,
signed by both parties. Rather they are dispersed among a number of instruments,
statutes, regulations, handbooks and the like, such that their precise identification
58 See also R. v. Oxford University ex p. Bolchover, The Times, 7th. October, 1970.
59 [1963] S.R. (N.S.W.) 723.
60 E.g. Thomson v. University of London (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 625 at 634; Patel v.
University of Bradford Senate supra. n.31.
61 [1966] 2 Q.B. 237 at 243 applied inM v London Guildhall University [1998] E.L.R.
149. See also R v. Higher Education Funding Council, ex p. Institute of Dental Surgery [1994]
1 W.L.R. 242. R v Liverpool John Moores University ex p. Hughes ( 1998) E.L.R. 261 per
Collins J at 271 "It would be quite impossible for any judge to order that she (sc. the applicant)
be awarded an honours degree."
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may well be a source of controversy.
In Ward Orr L.J. said:
"The drafting is on any view unfortunate and I agree that ... the
disciplinary provisions of the articles should be reconsidered as a
matter of urgency .'>62
As Lord Griffiths pointed out in Page, disaffected dons or students will be
astute to take any points available on badly drafted documents. He said:
"The learning and ingenuity of those members of the foundation
who are likely to be in dispute with the foundation should not be
lightly underestimated and I believe to admit certiorari to challenge
the visitor's decision on the ground of error oflaw will in practice
prove to be the introduction of an appeal by another name.'>63
Secondly, that the basic rules of natural justice be observed. The teacher or the
student are equally entitled to know the case against them; to be given adequate
opportunity to reply to it; and to be represented in substantial cases. The body
that disposes of their fate should not have among its membership anyone who has
been involved in bringing the case against before them. Prosecutors should not be
judges.
Thirdly (by way of qualification), no effort should be made to mimic to the
letter the procedures and practices of a court. Oral hearings are not required; still
less are dons or students entitled to legal representation before domestic bodies.
Nor is a don or student entitled as a matter oflaw to an internal appeal- although
the presence of one may dissuade him or her from seeking resort to the courts
themselves. Render unto the court the things that are the courts' and unto
domestic tribunals the things that are domestic tribunals' .
Fourthly, where misconduct is alleged, reasons ought to be given for any
punishment imposed: what the offence consisted of: how it was established: and
why the particular punishment fits the crime. There is no legal need, however, for
62 Supra.n.49 at 40.
63 Supra.n.12 at 694E.
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academic bodies to explain why a student's essay was not up to snuff.64
64 In R. v. Higher Education Funding Council, exparte Institute of Dental Surgery (D.C.)
supra.n.61, Sedley 1. said:
"We would hold that where what is sought to be impugned is on the evidence no
more than an informed exercise of academic judgment, fairness alone will not
require reasons to be given. This is not to say for a moment that academic
decisions are beyond challenge. A mark, for example, awarded as an examiners'
meeting where irrelevant and damaging personal factors have been allowed to
enter into the evaluation ofa candidate's written paper is something more than an
informed exercise of academic judgment. Where evidence shows that something
extraneous has entered into the process of academic judgment, one of two results
may follow depending on the nature of the fault; either the decision will fall
without more, or the court may require reasons to be given, so that the decision
can either be seen to be sound or can be seen or (absent reasons) be inferred to be.
flawed. But purely academic judgments, in our view, will as a rule not be in the
class of case exemplified, though by no means exhausted, by Ex parte Doody
[1993] 3 W.L.R. 154, where the nature and impact of the decision itself call for
reasons as a routine aspect of procedural fairness."[at 261B-E].
and at 263A-B
"In summary, then (1) there is no general duty to give reasons for a decision, but there are
classes of case where there is such a duty. (2) One such class is where the subject matter
is an interest so highly regarded by the law (for example, personal liberty), that fairness
requires that reasons, at least for particular decisions, be given as of right. (3) (a) Another
such class is where the decision appears aberrant. Here fairness may requi(y reasons so
that the recipient may know whether the aberration is in the legal sense'real (and so
challengeable) or apparent; (b) it follows that this class does not include decisions which
are themselves challengeable by reference only to the reasons for them. A pure exercise
of academic judgment is such a decision. And (c) procedurally, the grant of.leave in such
cases will depend upon prima facie evidence that something has gone:wrong. The
respondent may then seek to demonstrate that it is not so and that the decision is an
unalloyed exercised of an intrinsically unchallengeable judgment. If the respondent
succeeds, the application fails. If the respondent fails, relief may take the form of an order
of mandamus to give reasons, or (if a justiciable flaw has been established) other
appropriate relief.
But just as it is outwith this court's powers to judge degrees of excellence in clinical
dentistry research, or for that matter the wisdom of a body's administrative arrangements,
so it is not open to this court to require the communication of reasons, even where such
reasons must necessarily exist, in the current absence of a legal basis for the requirement."
But see also R v University of Cambridge ex parte Evans (D.C. Sedley 1. January 1998
(unreported).
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The rule against double jeopardy does not prevent academic institutions from
adjudicating upon matters which fall within the remit of the courts, especially the
criminal courts.
"The doctrines of double jeopardy qv 1977 A.C. 1 and res judicata
do not apply to domestic proceedings whether the first case is in an
external forum or in the domestic tribunal itself.'>6S
Indeed a conviction by a court may not - unless the university's own rules so
specify - be conclusive of commission of an offence before a university body. 66 It
was failure to recognise this principle which prompted one of the most famous
judicial observations of the twentieth century: "Convenience and justice are often
not on speaking terms. '>67
The Zellick report identified four separate situations where consideration had to
be given to the advisability of permitting concurrent proceedings - criminal and
disciplinary - to take place. Where the conduct is closely related to the academic
or other work of the university (e.g. theft oflibrary books):
(1) Where the conduct occurred on campus or other university property (i. e.
assault in the student union) they found no difficulty in engaging the disciplinary
machinery of the University.
(2) Where the conduct involved other university members but was off campus
(e.g. attempted rape of another student at her home) they found a prima facie
case for action.
(3) Where none of those features were present, but the conduct damaged the
university's reputation or threatened the university community (e.g. student
supplied drugs in town) they also found such a case although they urged caution.
In each instance, of course, it would be necessary to. ensure that the university
instruments identified the conduct as constituting an offence so that the university
had power to react: it was the prudence of exercising a power ex hypothesi
6S Forbes, The Law of Domestic or Private Tribunals. Law Book Company, 1982 atI49;
Zellick, supra.n.3 at para.32.
66 q GMCv. Spackman [1943] A.C. 627.
67 Ibid at 638 per Lord Atkin (cf though Zellick, .mpra. n.3 at para.33).
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enjoyed which engaged under consideration by Zellick.
Where the line is drawn is a matter more for judgment than for law: and
certainly not everyone agrees with the Zellick boundaries. Oxford has considered
them with care - the matter being complicated by the division of responsibilities
between University and College. Abstinence from action by the University
organs, if the offence is in their judgment clearly made out is not a sensible
option. In particular, in that grey area where sexual harassment shades into
criminal assault and worse the universities must tread with care but with
resolution.
STAY
Of course, the courts may intervene to stay domestic proceedings where they
themselves are seized of the relevant issue. In R. v. B.B.C. ex p. Lavelle, Woolf
1. (as he then was) held that a court had power to cause domestic disciplinary
proceedings to be adjourned on the grounds that their construction could
prejudice criminal proceedings:
"it will only do so in very clear cases on which the applicant can
show that there is a real danger and not merely a notional danger
that there would be a miscarriage of justice in the criminal
proceedings if the Court did not intervene.'>68
Universities should accordingly ensure that they have provisions to suspend
students charged with serious offences: but that such decisions be taken only
after according the student a right to make representations, a full review of the
facts and even (ex abundanti cautela) an appeal mechanism:
"Universities are not at risk of legal action nor would they have to
pay compensation for suspending a student in accordance with their
procedures even if the student is subsequently acquitted in the
Courts after a lengthy period of suspension. '>69
68 [1983] 1W.L.R. 241 at 255g-h.
69 Zellick, supra.n.3 at para.29.
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ENVOI
Basing himself on the above principles the author drafted a model disciplinary
code for the conference of Oxford Colleges. To the extent to which it was
adopted, time will tell whether his analysis of what fairness required will be
accepted by the courts.
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